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TRUTH-WARRANTED MANIFESTATION BELIEFS 
John Zeis 
In Perceiving God, William Alston has argued that manifestation beliefs 
(M-beliefs) are warranted or justified in a way analogous to the justification 
of perceptual beliefs. However, there seems to be a sort of M-belief reported 
by the Carmelite mystics, Saints Teresa and John of the Cross, which are 
self-authenticating (SAM-beliefs). In this paper, I argue for an alternative 
view concerning the warrant of SAM-beliefs. I will suggest that SAM-beliefs 
are justified in a way analogous to the way in which Alston has suggested 
that privileged-access beliefs are justified: namely, they are truth-warranted. 
Introduction 
In his work from "Christian Experience and Christian Belief,j through "Re-
ligious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of God"2 to Perceiving God,3 
William Alston has argued relentlessly against the epistemic chauvinism or 
imperialism and the double standard which critics of the epistemic integrity 
of experiential knowledge of God employ. In Perceiving God, Alston presents 
strong and detailed argumentation that Christian mystical practice, like per-
ceptual practice, is a functioning, socially established practice with distinc-
tive experiential inputs, distinctive input-output functions, a distinctive 
conceptual scheme, and a rich, internally justified overrider system. And 
since we are rationally justified in believing Christian mystical practice to be 
reliable, its outputs are thereby prima facie justified. 
If Alston's attempt to establish the rationality of believing in the reliability 
of mystical practice in Perceiving God is successful, then I think he has gone 
a long way in rebutting the epistemic imperialists as well as those who appeal 
to a double standard of justification. However, I do not think that it is nec-
essary to argue for all M-beliefs4 being grounded in a socially established 
doxastic system. There is another route, itself derivable from Alston's 
epistemic theory, which does not rely upon there being such a practice. 
In this paper, I do not wish to dispute Alston's thesis concerning the justi-
fication of M-beliefs, as much as to propose an alternative position. In fact 
I think that the position which I will propose is consistent with Alston's 
position if one grants that not all M-beliefs need have the same ground or are 
of the same sort. It may very well be the case that some M -beliefs are justified 
in the way which Alston proposes while some others are justified in the way 
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I will suggest. Of course if someone holds the position that grounding in a 
socially established doxastic practice is a necessary condition of epistemic 
justification, then the two positions are not consistent. 
In any case, I will argue that at least some M-beliefs are justified because 
they are truth-warranted. One of the most significant differences between the 
doxastic practice defense of Alston and the truth-warrant defense is that if 
M-beliefs are truth-warranted, the epistemological parallel between percep-
tual beliefs being grounded in perceptual practice and M-beliefs being 
grounded in mystical practice which Alston considers crucial no longer nec-
essarily holds. In the truth-warranted position, M-beliefs are grounded in a 
fashion which is rather unique and peculiar. Those sympathetic to Alston's 
approach would be most likely to consider this in itself a defect of my 
position, but as I hope to argue successfully later in the paper, this is not so 
and there are certain advantages to viewing justification of M-beliefs in the 
way I will suggest. 
In Perceiving God, Alston mentions and hastily dismisses a position on the 
justification of M-beliefs which he calls the "self-authentication" thesis.5 He 
cites Robert Oakes as a friend of the self-authentication thesis, which, as 
Alston sees it, is the claim that: 
the experiences carry with them an adequate sign or mark of their authentic-
ity, so that, as Oakes says, the experience itself provides a justification for 
believing that it is an awareness of God's presence.6 
Alston rejects the self-authentication thesis on the grounds that: 
Delusory experiences can be phenomenologically indistinguishable from 
veridical ones, in the mystical realm as well as the sensory. Nothing in the 
experience itself suffices to distinguish one from the other. 7 
As Alston sees it, there is no reason to take so strong a stand on the nature 
of the justification of M-beliefs, and in chapter 5, he argues that the claim of 
self-authentication for M-beliefs is atypical of the religious tradition and for 
the great mystics of the Middles Ages and Counter-Reformation, self-authen-
tication is "the furthest thing from their mind."8 
The Warrant of PA-beliefs 
The thesis that M-beliefs are self-authenticating bears, I think, a strong re-
semblance to a position on privileged access beliefs ("PA-beliefs") which 
Alston himself held in one of his earlier writings on the subject. In "Self-
Warrant: A Neglected Form of Privileged Access," Alston argues for the 
position that PA beliefs are justified by their being self-warranted. According 
to Alston, "a belief, b, is self-warranted if and only if b is warranted just by 
virtue of being b (being b is sufficient for b's being warranted)."9 Self-war-
ranted beliefs are a limiting case of immediately justified beliefs for, unlike 
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beliefs in the paradigmatic set,IO there is nothing distinct from the belief itself 
which serves as its ground. In "Self-Warrant," Alston argued that self-war-
ranted beliefs, although immediately justified, are such that they have no 
independent ground for their justification. 
In developing the concept of epistemic justification in essays after "Privi-
leged Access," Alston has insisted that no belief is justified unless it is based 
on adequate grounds. 11 This has led him to reject the main thesis of self-war-
rant defended in "Privileged Access" and instead adopt a position of truth-
warrant for PA-beliefs. That the grounds of PA-beliefs are "not distinguished 
from the fact that makes them true," ... "support(s) a diagnosis of truth-war-
rant, rather than of self-warrant."12 The principle of truth-warrant I would 
assume he has in mind would be some such version of what he considers and 
then rejects in "Privileged Access," viz., "A B is warranted if and only if it 
is true."13 And since adequate grounds for a belief in Alston's sense are what 
the belief is based on,14 PA-beliefs are adequately grounded if and only if 
they are based on the truth of the belief. 
Regarding the justification of PA-beliefs, Alston's position has then under-
gone a development. Whereas he first supported a notion of PA-beliefs being 
self-warranted, he has since altered his position such that he later construes 
PA-beliefs to be justified because they are truth-warranted. I am not sure 
whether by the self-authentication thesis for M-beliefs he has in mind some-
thing like self-warrant or truth-warrant or some third alternative. But if the 
self-authentication thesis is to be construed as a thesis concerning the self-
warrant of M-beliefs. then I would agree with Alston that we ought not 
consider M-beliefsjustified because they are self-warranted. However, I think 
that a case can be made for construing M-beliefs as truth-warranted, following 
his lead in the development of the position on the justification of PA-beliefs. 
M-beliefs as Truth-warranted 
Alston's epistemological treatment of mystical experience is a generic analy-
sis which does not consider that mystical experiences that differ in kind may 
require distinct justificatory conditions. It is not that Alston is unaware of the 
fact that mystical experiences may be of different sorts, but that he sees "no 
reason to suppose that any of the epistemological and ontological issues with 
which we are concerned will be significantly affected by this difference."15 
But I think that there is a certain sort or sorts of mystical experience reported 
by the Carmelite mystics John of the Cross and Teresa of Avila that may 
indeed require us to consider having a different type of epistemological 
ground than that which a doxastic practice provides. 
St. John of the Cross, in chapter XXVI of Book II of The Ascent of Mount 
Carmel, speaks of a mystical experience which he calls a "knowledge of pure 
truths." 
TRUTH-WARRANTED MANIFESTATION BELIEFS 
This knowledge consists in a certain contact of the soul with the Divinity, 
and it is God Himself Who is then felt and tasted, though not manifestly and 
distinctly, as it will be in glory. But this touch of knowledge and sweetness 
is so strong and so profound that it penetrates into the inmost substance of 
the soul, and the devil cannot interfere with it, nor produce anything like it 
... This knowledge savours, in some measure, of the divine essence and of 
everlasting life, and the devil has no power to simulate anything so great. 16 
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St. Teresa of Avila, in The Interior Castle, reports of what she calls an 
intellectual vision, which appears to have similar marks with the knowledge 
of pure truths described by John. 
This vision comes in another unexplainable, more delicate way. But it is so 
certain and leaves much certitude; even much more than the other visions do 
because in the visions that come through the senses one can be deceived, but 
not in the intellectual vision. For this latter brings great interior benefits and 
effects that couldn't be present if the experience were caused by melancholy; 
nor would the devil produce so much good. I? 
Although John of the Cross and Teresa categorize these sorts of mystical 
experiences in different ways, what I think is instructive is the fact that both 
of them identify these mystical experiences as ones which cannot be coun-
terfeited by the devil. If they are right, and there are such experiences, then 
Alston'S objection to the self-authenticating thesis does not apply. His objec-
tion was that mystical experiences, just like sensory experiences, can be 
delusory.18 But if St. John and St. Teresa are correct and even the devil, with 
all his cunning and power, cannot simulate such experiences, how could mere 
delusion simulate them? Hence, I think we ought to reconsider self-authen-
ticating manifestation beliefs (SAM-beliefs), which is how I will refer to the 
beliefs which are formed on the basis of the sorts of mystical experiences 
which the Carmelite mystics attest to in the passages above. 
One may object though, that the beliefs of the type that Saints Teresa and 
John of the Cross attest to should not be construed as properly basic, but as 
beliefs which are inferred from other more basic beliefs. For example, Ter-
esa's mystical belief presupposes certain beliefs which she has about God's 
nature and the kinds of actions which God can perform, as well as the nature 
of the devil and what he can't bring about. So, the objection goes, Teresa's 
mystical beliefs are not properly basic but inferred from other more basic 
beliefs, some of which are these background beliefs. But as Alston notes in 
"What's Wrong with Immediate Knowledge?"19 the same sort of objection 
could be raised against other sorts of properly basic beliefs like PA-beliefs 
and simple arithmetical beliefs, and just confuses levels of questioning. 
Immediate knowledge is knowledge in which the belief involved is not 
epistemized by a relation to another knowledge or epistemized belief of the 
same subject. But in the above cases what is alleged is that the very existence 
of the belief depends on other knowledge. Unless I know what it is to be P, 
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I can't so much as form the belief that x is P, for I lack the concept of P. 
Unless I know something about outward criteria of conscious states, I cannot 
so much as form the belief that I feel tired, for I lack the concept of feeling 
tired. Unless I know something about the rest of the number system, I cannot 
so much as form the belief that 2+3=5, for I lack the requisite concepts. But 
all this says nothing as to what epistemizes the belief, once formed, and it is 
on this that the classification into immediate or mediate depends.2o 
So yes, of course Teresa's and John of the Cross's mystical beliefs depend 
for their existence upon other beliefs about God and the rest of the world in 
relation to God, just as my belief that 2+3=5 depends for its existence upon 
other beliefs I have about the number system, or my belief that I am tired 
depends upon other beliefs like what it is to be tired. But this does not imply 
that they cannot be properly basic. 
There may be another level confusion involved in the objection as well. 
Tesesa, in the passage from the The Interior Castle quoted above, does cite 
that the mystical experience "brings great interior benefits and effects." So 
she is, in some sense, appealing to the effects of the experience for justifica-
tion of her belief that these experiences are valid. But that she cites these 
effects in this passage does not entail that these effects are necessarily in-
volved in her state of being justified. If I am challenged to provide a justifi-
cation of my belief that there really is a tree in front of me, I may walk over 
to the tree and pound my fist against it as further evidence that there is indeed 
a tree there. But, be this as it may, it does not entail that my original belief 
that there is a tree in front of me was justified or warranted on the basis of 
the projected effects. This is just to confuse the conditions for the state or 
condition of justified belief with the conditions for a successful process of 
justifying belief.21 Likewise, Teresa, in The Interior Castle, is articulating her 
experience for us, many who may very well question how she could be so 
sure that her experiences were authentic. As such, she is engaging in the 
process of justifying and the evidence of the effects which she cites is indeed 
helpful to us and further confirms her belief, but that does not entail that 
those effects were necessarily part of the ground of her original belief that 
she was having an authentic mystical experience. 
However, one may grant that the SAM-beliefs referred to by Saints Teresa 
and John of the Cross in the above quotations are properly basic, but question 
whether their belief that SAM-experiences cannot be counterfeited by the 
devil is properly basic. It seems that the veridicality of SAM-experiences is 
not read off from the experience itself, but is rather inferred from the nature 
of the effects of the experience and other theological beliefs. After all, in the 
quotes from both Teresa and John of the Cross above, it seems that they are 
in fact inferring that such experiences cannot be counterfeited. John of the 
Cross seems to be inferring that since the experience "penetrates into the 
inmost substance of the soul" and "savours, in some measure, of the divine 
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essence and everlasting life" that the devil could not counterfeit it. Teresa 
seems to be inferring from the certitude and great interior benefits the same 
conclusion. The objection is that if Teresa and John of the Cross are inferring 
that SAM-experiences cannot be counterfeited, the belief that such experi-
ences cannot be counterfeited cannot be properly basic and consequently that 
such experiences cannot be self-authenticating. 
Now I am quite willing to grant that the Carmelite mystics, in the quotations 
above, are inferring that such experiences cannot be counterfeited by the 
devil, but do not think that this threatens the self-authenticating nature of 
SAM-experiences. Whether it is inferred from the experience or it is properly 
basic, what Teresa and John of the Cross both attest to is that such experiences 
cannot be counterfeited, and this is what Alston, in the quote above attacking 
the self-authentication thesis, denies. If Teresa and John of the Cross are right, 
either by inference or in a properly basic way, this distinguishes SAM expe-
riences from sensory beliefs, memory beliefs, beliefs about other minds and 
material objects, etc. Such heliefs are not self-authenticating and the belief 
that such beliefs cannot be counterfeited is not properly basic nor can it be 
reached by a sound inference. 
The position which I am defending is that SAM-beliefs are analogous to 
privileged access beliefs. I assume that Descartes' cog ito sum is a paradigm 
case of a privileged-access belief; and his recognition of the self-authenticat-
ing nature of the cogito sum, like the belief of the Carmelite mystics regarding 
the veridicality of SAM-beliefs, can be similarly construed as being reached 
by inference. 
But there is a deceiver (I know not who he is) powerful and sly in the highest 
degree, who is always purposely deceiving me. Then there is no doubt that 
I exist, if he deceives me. . . Thus it must be granted that, after weighing 
everything carefully and sufficiently, one must come to the considered judg-
ment that the statement "I am, I exist" is necessarily true every time it is 
uttered by me or conceived in my mind.22 
I am not suggesting here that Descartes' inference is correct, but what I am 
suggesting is that the fact that Descartes infers that the cogito sum cannot be 
counterfeited by the evil genius in no way impugns the self-authentication of 
the cog ito sum. As for the Carmelite mystics in the case of SAM-experiences, 
Descartes is reading off from the experience of the thought certain properties 
(as he sees it, its clarity and distinctness) which together with his beliefs 
about what such a being as the evil genius might be able to produce, entail 
that such a thought cannot be counterfeited. Now he may be wrong about 
what he takes to be read off from the experience or what the evil genius may 
or may not be able to produce or whether all this entails the truth of the cog ito 
sum. But if he were right, then the fact that he infers the veridicality of the 
cogito sum does not falsify the self-authenticating nature of the cogito sum, 
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it confirms it. Likewise, the Carmelite mystics seem to me to be reading off 
from their experience certain properties, including the effects of such expe-
riences upon their soul, such that together with certain beliefs that they hold 
about what God and the devil are and can do, imply that only God can cause 
such experiences. If so, then SAM-beliefs, like privileged-access beliefs, are 
uniquely authenticated. 
It seems to me that this objection confuses the self-warrant view of SAM-
beliefs, which I rejected, with the truth-warrant view. If a belief is self-war-
ranted, all of its warrant comes from the belief itself. So if a self-warranted 
belief were not properly basic, granted, I can't see how it could be self-
authenticating. But in the truth-warrant view, the ground is not merely the 
belief, but the truth of the belief. I take it that this is one of the reasons why 
Alston rejects the self-warrant view in later writings in favor of the truth-
warrant view. And if Alston is right about grounds being accessible, the 
grounds of beliefs which are truth-warranted must be via the experience itself. 
It is not the belief alone which is self-authenticating. It is the ground of such 
a belief which makes such a belief self-authenticating. The properties read 
off from the experience (not the belief itself) provide the ground. 
Extending then Alston's diagnosis oftruth-warrant for PA-beliefs, I propose 
that we take SAM-beliefs as an extraordinary species of PA-beliefs. Like 
beliefs about one's own mental states, SAM-beliefs are such that the agent 
has privileged access. The agent is in a cognitive state which gives her a 
privileged position in relation to its justifying conditions, and whatever jus-
tifies the agent's believing M, no one else can have the same justification. 
SAM-beliefs are justified because they are truth-warranted: a SAM-belief is 
warranted if and only if it is based on its truth. What would justify my 
believing that God is manifesting Himself to me now is its being grounded 
in the truth that God is manifesting Himself to me now; but its being true 
that God is manifesting Himself to me now cannot function as a warrant for 
anyone else's believing that God is manifesting Himself to me now. Con-
strued in this way, SAM-experiences, like other PA-experiences, are self-pre-
senting23 and SAM-beliefs are a limiting case of properly basic beliefs. 
That SAM-beliefs are truth-warranted by being PA-beliefs of an extraordi-
nary character I think coincides with the way we view the nature of what 
Alston seems to refer to as "mountaintop" M-beliefs. Abraham, Moses, St. 
Paul, St. John of the Cross, St. Teresa and the many anonymous believers 
who have had M-beliefs have a degree of warrant for God's presence which 
is unsurpassed by the degree of warrant possessed by beliefs formed by any 
doxastic practice in the paradigmatic set.24 As Plantinga has argued, we ought 
not to conceive of properly basic M-beliefs as in need of strengthening or 
support via mediate justification. As I suggest, SAM-beliefs have a degree of 
certitude which is as strong as the degree of certitude of any other sort of 
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properly basic beliefs. This is reflected in the resolve of the believer under 
even very difficult circumstances. Abraham had no doubts that God wanted 
him to sacrifice Isaac and Mary no doubt that she would conceive, even 
though the "defeaters" of such beliefs seem to be overwhelming. So, SAM-
beliefs are not just prima facie justified, they are unqualifiedly justified.25 
SAM-beliefs are an extraordinary type of PA-beliefs. It is not typical that 
humans would form such beliefs in a reliable way, and there is no natural 
mechanism or doxastic practice which converts the input to outpUt.26 SAM-
beliefs are formed through a supernatural doxastic practice. God's grace 
elevates the intellect of the person to whom He presents Himself, and God's 
manifestation to us is possible only through a supernatural alteration of the 
cognitive powers of the human intellect. As a result, most of us, most of the 
time, do not have the capacity to form SAM-beliefs; and it is quite possible 
that some of us never are granted the capacity to form SAM-beliefs. As the 
congenitally blind person has no reliable perceptual mechanism for the for-
mation of properly basic color beliefs, the person (believer or non-believer), 
to whom God does not graciously manifest himself in this self-presenting 
way, has no reliable cognitive mechanism, and cannot form SAM-beliefs. 
And lacking such a cognitive mechanism, it would be unimaginable to such 
a person how such basic beliefs are formed. I cannot imagine what kind of 
experience would justify my belief that God has commanded me to sacrifice my 
son; whatever I conceive of, seems subject to conclusive doubt or deception. 
Although SAM-beliefs are warranted to such a high degree, one must keep 
in mind that under my proposal, such beliefs are warranted if and only if they 
are true. This is another distinguishing mark from properly basic beliefs 
which are not of the PA sort or (I would guess) of the general class of 
M-beliefs which Alston considers. There is a tree, or Tom is in pain may be 
warranted in a properly basic way, even in circumstances where the beliefs 
are false, and not warranted in circumstances where the beliefs are true. But 
if I am right, truth is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the ground-
ing of SAM-beliefs. It does not follow however that SAM-beliefs are infal-
libly justified. 27 If someone has an SAM -belief and it is not true, such a belief 
is then unjustified. Mary's belief that she will conceive, Abraham's that he 
sacrifice his son, are properly basic beliefs and warranted if and only if those 
beliefs are true.28 
As a species of PA-beliefs, SAM-beliefs are essentially subjectively justi-
fied. This is the most obvious difference between the justification conditions 
for beliefs in the paradigmatic set and SAM-beliefs. But barring some reason 
for epistemic imperialism, SAM-beliefs can be properly basic, even though 
the conditions which would make them properly basic are dramatically dif-
ferent from the conditions which make beliefs in the paradigmatic set prop-
erly basic. 
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Conclusion 
What are the significant conclusions that can be drawn from the account of 
the justification of SAM-beliefs that I have given? In particular, in what way 
does this account differ from the alternative model provided by Alston in 
Perceiving God and earlier essays? 
First, it is clear that Alston's account of the justification of M-beliefs does 
not in any way rely upon the postulation of a phenomenal quality which 
distinguishes veridical from non-veridical M-beliefs. The position that SAM-
beliefs are truth-warranted may appear to presume that there is such a quality. 
But in what way such a phenomenal quality is presumed by a truth-warrant 
account is not clear-cut. 
What I think might very well be the case is that it is quite possible that 
there is such a quality, but that it is only identifiable by those who have had 
veridical manifestation experiences, and that such experiences are not the sort 
that can be well-articulated to those who have not had the experience.29 And 
so for those of us who haven't had such experiences, the testimony of the 
enlightened gives us very little insight into what the experience might be like. 
As St. Teresa recounted, "I did not know how I knew it ... There are no 
words to explain."30 George Mavrodes suggests that these experiences are 
basic, and that like other basic actions or experiences, we just do them or 
have them, and there is nothing of note to articulate about them. 31 So even if 
there is a phenomenological mark of SAM-beliefs which accompanies a valid 
cognition, if this experience cannot be communicated by authentic mystics, 
spurious manifestation experiences would still be problematic. For all I know, 
there may be a phenomenological characteristic of genuine SAM-beliefs 
which spurious SAM-beliefs lack. But don't ask me what that property might 
be, for I am here like the congenitally blind man being asked to describe the 
phenomenology of color perception. And, in any case, if there is such a 
phenomenal quality, it is not something that can be infallibly identified. 32 
But there now seem to be strong disanalogies between SAM-beliefs and 
PA-beliefs. After aU, if SAM-beliefs are not infallible, one can have false 
SAM-beliefs, and this does not seem to be the case with PA-beliefs. Another 
point of disanalogy is that warranted PA-beliefs are universal whereas war-
ranted SAM-beliefs (as far as I can tell) are held by only a special few. 
Another difference is that whereas PA-beliefs are beliefs about a state which 
is internal to the subject, SAM-beliefs are about a reality (viz., God) which 
is external to the subject. How then can I hold that SAM-beliefs and PA-be-
liefs are similarly grounded? 
It seems to me that the possibility of having false SAM-beliefs and the fact 
that warranted SAM-beliefs are not universal are connected. One of the rea-
sons why we do not have false PA-beliefs is because paradigmatic PA-beliefs 
are about experiences which are common to all humans. Take, for example, 
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beliefs about being in pain. We have all experienced pain as long as we can 
remember and well before we had a language in which we could articulate 
beliefs about pain. Hence, if in learning language about pain, one forms what 
appears to be false first person pain beliefs, we would say that the person has 
not correctly mastered the concept of pain, that she doesn't understand the 
language properly. Since we take it for granted that the person has pain 
experiences, we insist that a proper understanding of the concept of pain must 
entail true ascriptions of first person pain beliefs and since the ability to make 
such true ascriptions is a necessary condition of having a mastery of the 
concept of pain, seemingly false first person pain beliefs are rejected as 
conceptual or linguistic confusions. And then when a person does master the 
concept of pain such that she forms true first person pain beliefs with recog-
nition, false PA-beliefs are ruled-out by the self-authenticating phenomenon 
of pain. 
But imagine if pain were not such a universal phenomenon. Imagine an 
alien who migrates to earth and is such that although he shares much in 
common with human life, he has never experienced pain. However, amongst 
the things which this alien does share with humans is something akin to 
certain forms of pain behavior (say, grimacing or the like in certain appro-
priate circumstances). If this alien then learns our language, it would seem 
to me quite plausible that he would form false first person pain beliefs. And 
for such an alien, since he has never experienced pain but shares pain behav-
ior with us and forms first person pain beliefs in the appropriate behavioral 
circumstances, he might have no clue that such beliefs are false. Imagine 
further that this alien life form's biological constitution is affected by long 
exposure to the earth's environment such that he suddenly begins to experi-
ence pain. After an initial shock, the alien would be able to recognize his 
earlier first person pain beliefs as false, and would hardly be tempted to form 
such false beliefs in the future. 
The alien hypothesis is not as far-fetched as it may appear. I remember as 
a young boy witnessing my father experiencing leg cramps. I was very curious 
about what sort of experience he was having; and being an active and acci-
dent-prone boy, who was never without bumps, bruises, aches and pains of 
all sorts, (and wanting to be as much like my father as I could be), I thought 
at times that I too had leg cramps. As I got a bit older and wiser, less active 
and hence less susceptible to the ever accompanying aches and pains of 
childhood, I stopped forming beliefs about having leg cramps. Then, in early 
middle age, I was awakened in the middle of the night by an excruciating leg 
cramp. I knew then that I had never had such an experience before, namely, 
any sort of cramping experience, and since then believe that I have never 
formed any false first person beliefs about having such an experience. That 
certain cramping sort of experience is self-authenticating. 
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What I am suggesting in my alien example and my example about cramps 
is that PA-beliefs are not necessarily infallible. What is common to both 
examples is that the sort of experience which grounds the PA-beliefs is an 
experience which is not universally shared and the subject experiences only 
some time after he already has the linguistic resources necessary to articulate 
such beliefs. In such cases, it seems quite plausible that false first person PA-
beliefs be formed, or that a shift in meaning or understanding has occurred.33 
Now SAM experiences, if I am right, are much more like my alien's expe-
rience of pain or my illuminating leg cramp experience in the middle of the 
night than they are like our more common PA experiences. If, as I am arguing, 
SAM experiences require a supernatural alteration of our cognitive processes, 
and yet many of us can read the mystics and have experiences with similar 
behavioral manifestations, it would seem quite natural that some of us who 
have never been blessed with legitimate SAM experiences could easily form 
false SAM beliefs. And as in my own case of forming false leg cramping 
beliefs, there may well be a component of wishful thinking involved: many 
might wish to be a mystic. as I wished to be like my father. But for those 
who have been blessed with the authentic experience, they will only form 
true SAM beliefs. as I now only form true leg cramping pain beliefs. 
But still, one may question how even God, through a supernatural alteration 
of our cognitive processes, could bring about such self-authenticating expe-
riences of Himself. It would seem that even God could not bring it about for 
me, for example, that there is an eagle sitting on that limb is a self-authen-
ticating experience. entailing as it does a fact about the world external to me. 
It does seem to me problematic, given that eagles and limbs of trees are 
objects which are necessarily external to me. But then there doesn't seem to 
be the same problem with experiences like God is comforting me now. If God 
is the source and the ground of being, He is the source and the ground of my 
being. God is not an object external to me like an eagle or a tree. The 
supernatural alteration of the cognitive process could involve God's making 
His presence self-evident to me. As John of the Cross says, "this knowledge 
consists in a certain contact of the soul with the Divinity, and it is God 
Himself Who is then felt and tasted."34 
And God's presence within me does not necessarily entail His being me. 
Common PA experiences are distinguished such that some are intentional and 
some are not, e.g I am experiencing the color blue versus I am blue. When I 
am feeling blue, there is an identity of the subject (myself) and the object 
(the feeling). But If I am experiencing the color blue, it is a self-authenticating 
experience, but within the experience there is nonetheless a clear intentional 
distinction between myself (the subject) and the color experienced (the ob-
ject). If the Holy Spirit really does dwell within us, why can't He make 
Himself self-evidently manifest within us via certain extraordinary interior 
intentional experiences? 
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The second notable difference between Alston's position and the truth-war-
rant position is that Alston's position relies upon M-beliefs being grounded 
in a socially established doxastic practice which we are rational to believe is 
reliable, whereas the truth-warrant account that I have given in no way relies 
upon grounding SAM-beliefs in such a practice. I would hold that such a 
ground is not necessary for certain M-beliefs, namely, those which are of the 
SAM sort. What, for example, would be the socially established doxastic 
practice which grounded Abraham's M-beliefs? I would suggest that there 
was none, and that the truth-warrant model gives us a better picture than the 
doxastic practice model of the sort of M-beliefs Abraham had. On the other 
hand, my position is quite open to the possibility that there may be other sorts 
of M-experiences which are not self-presenting and thereby need to be 
grounded (if they are at all grounded) in a different way. After all, it does 
seem as if the documented M-experiences of Abraham, Moses, Mary, Saul, 
St. Teresa, and of the other saints and prophets, are of a rather exotic sort. 
Maybe there is a less exotic sort. more common amongst believers, which 
are warranted in an entirely different way. Here the doxastic practice ap-
proach seems to me to be quite valuable. 
Teresa's and John of the Cross's taxonomies of manifestation experiences 
seem to confirm the distinct nature of the justificatory conditions of distinct 
sorts of M-experiences. For example, John of the Cross distinguishes many 
different types of mystical experiences. Regarding what he considers as spiri-
tual visitations of the interior sense, he warns us that these experiences can 
be produced by the devil as well as being the work of God. And unless they 
are in clear conformity with the Gospels, we ought to take no notice of them. 
If St. John is right and there are M-experiences of interior sense, I think that 
Alston's doxastic practice approach provides a plausible rendering of the 
justificatory conditions of M-beliefs formed on the basis of such experiences. 
But, as noted on p. 438 above, John of the Cross also speaks of a different 
sort of mystical experience: a supernatural union with God which produces 
a "knowledge of pure truths" and cannot be counterfeited by the devil. Ac-
cording to St. John, these sorts of mystical experiences are on a higher plane 
and are of the sort Moses and David experienced.35 If there are mystical 
experiences of this sort, I think that the truth-warrant position provides a 
much more plausible epistemological rendering of them than does Alston's 
doxastic practice approach. 
There is a way in which the doxastic practice approach may be incorporated 
into the position I have suggested. Alston has continually reminded us of the 
distinction between being justified versus the process of justification. If some 
M-beliefs are justified in the way which I have suggested, the justification, 
as I noted above, is subjective. Hence for such beliefs, their grounds would 
not be effective evidentially in showing that one is justified. It seems clear 
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to me that whether or not Christian doxastic practice (CDP) is a necessary 
component of the justification of M-beliefs, it seems to be quite relevant, and 
maybe even necessary for the process of justification. St. Teresa may not have 
needed CDP to be justified in her M-beliefs, but to show to others that she 
was so justified, appeal to CDP appears to be essential. SAM-beliefs are 
justified only if they are true. And although if true, they are evident to the 
subject. SAM-beliefs can seem evidently true and consequently properly ba-
sic, even when they are not true. In short, since we are not infallible in our 
identification of true M-beliefs, even though someone may be immediately 
justified in believing certain M-beliefs, their emphatic claims are no reason 
for someone else's taking them as justified. Only those who have true SAM-
beliefs are warranted, and since we have no access to that which grounds 
someone else's SAM-beliefs and since claims about SAM-beliefs may con-
flict, we need to find some other way to approach the question ofthe plausible 
truth of such claims: another way seems to be through grounding in a doxastic 
practice. 
There is one more way in which CDP can be relevant to the justification 
of SAM-beliefs even if my view is correct. CDP can confirm such beliefs. 
But as I have described them. SAM-beliefs do not seem to be in need of 
further confirmation. Well, I think we ought to distinguish between having 
an M-belief about a present experience, and having an M-belief about an 
experience which we have had in the past. When I am left with an M-belief 
(whether of the SAM sort or not), and am no longer having the M-experience, 
my memory of having had just the right sort of experience can be easily 
clouded by doubt, particularly given the uncommon nature of such an expe-
rience. So the grounds of justification for M-beliefs while I am having an 
M-experience may be quite different than the grounds of justification when 
I am no longer having such an experience. 
Another significant difference is of a more global sort. Alston's position 
relies upon a reliabilist conception of justification in general. But maybe that 
is not the way to go. Alvin Plantinga, most recently in Warrant and Proper 
Function, has argued that a warranted belief is one which is formed by a 
cognitive capacity which is properly functioning in a congenial epistemic 
environment according to a design plan which is aimed at the truth. On such 
a view, grounding in a socially established doxastic practice appears to be 
irrelevant to warrant. I think my position is quite in line with the proper 
function approach. SAM-beliefs can be construed as outputs of a cognitive 
faculty functioning properly. The only stipulation that needs to be made is 
that these beliefs are not formed in accordance with the design as ordinarily 
or naturally instantiated. but rather as the result of a supernatural modem of 
awareness added by God to our cognitive system under special circumstances. 
Alston's position construes M-beliefs as analogous to perceptual beliefs, 
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hence the title Perceiving God. If my view is correct, PA-beliefs are better 
analogues for some M-beliefs. Why? If SAM-beliefs are justified in the way 
I have suggested, this better explains why SAM-beliefs, unlike perceptual 
beliefs, are not universal or intersubjective. God does not build into our 
natural design the capacity for having SAM-beliefs and so only those for 
whom God has modified their design experience God's presence in this ex-
traordinary way. It also explains better, or at least as well, the difficulty of 
articulating the character of SAM-beliefs. 
As a final note, I would say that Alston's position on M-beliefs is one which 
is epistemically weaker than mine concerning justification, but stronger than 
mine on the potential for showing that one is justified. The truth-warrant 
position entails that a SAM-belief is justified if and only if it is true, so there 
are no warranted false SAM-beliefs in this position. This is the sense in which 
the truth-warrant position is epistemically stronger than the doxastic practice 
approach. But the rigid requirement that SAM-beliefs be true in order to be 
justified results in a weaker position in the truth-warrant view for showing 
such beliefs to be justified. However, since I hold that CDP can be appealed 
to in the process of justifying M-beliefs, this relative weakness can be to 
some extent addressed. 36 
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